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Abstract 1 
Individuals with Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia (MTS) experience touch on their own bodies 2 
when observing another person being touched. Whilst somatosensory processing in MTS has 3 
been extensively investigated, the extent to which the remapping of observed touch on the 4 
synaesthete’s body can also lead to changes in the mental representation of the self remains 5 
unknown. We adapted the experimental paradigm of the ‘Enfacement Illusion’ to quantify the 6 
changes in self-face recognition as a result of synaesthetic touch. MTS and control 7 
participants observed the face of an unfamiliar person being touched or not, without 8 
delivering touch on the participant’s face. Changes in self-representation were quantified with 9 
a self-face recognition task, using ‘morphed’ images containing varying proportions of the 10 
participant’s face and the face of the unfamiliar other. This task was administered before and 11 
after the exposure to the other face. While self-recognition performance for both groups was 12 
similar during pre-test, MTS individuals showed a significant change in self-recognition 13 
performance following the observation of touch delivered to the other face. Specifically, the 14 
images that participants had initially perceived as containing equal quantities of self and other 15 
became more likely to be recognised as the self after viewing the other being touched. These 16 
results suggest that observing touch on others not only elicits a conscious experience of touch 17 
in MTS, but also elicits a change in the mental representation of the self, blurring self-other 18 
boundaries. This is consistent with a multisensory account of the self, whereby integrated 19 
multisensory experiences maintain or update self-representations. 20 
Key Words: mirror-touch synaesthesia, multisensory integration, self, face recognition, 21 
body representation. 22 
23 
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1. Introduction 24 
Mirroring properties in neurons in the primate brain have been well documented since 25 
the discovery of the mirror neurons in macaque monkeys (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & 26 
Fogassi, 1996). There is now strong evidence supporting the presence of a similar Mirror 27 
Neuron System (MNS) in humans, which is thought to provide a neural basis for the 28 
interpersonal sharing of motor representations (e.g. Buccino et al., 2001; Mukamel, Ekstrom, 29 
Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010). Furthermore, evidence has suggested that the MNS is not 30 
restricted to the motor cortex in humans, but that we also possess a ‘somatosensory mirror 31 
system’ that is activated both when we perceive touch to others, and when we experience 32 
touch to the self (e.g. Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005; Ebisch et al., 2008; 33 
Keysers et al., 2004; Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010; Rossetti, Miniussi, Maravita, & 34 
Bolognini, 2012). This vicarious activation of the somatosensory cortex may form a neural 35 
basis for the understanding of others’ sensory experiences, and may play an important role in 36 
empathy (e.g. Schaefer, Heinze, & Rotte, 2012).  37 
Interestingly, this vicarious somatosensory activity to observed touch has measurable 38 
behavioural effects. Perception of touch to our own bodies, when delivered near the 39 
perceptual threshold, can be modulated by the observation of touch to others (e.g. Cardini et 40 
al., 2011; Serino, Giovagnoli, & Làdavas, 2009; Serino, Pizzoferrato, & Làdavas, 2008). For 41 
example, viewing someone being touched on the cheek can enhance detection of a tactile 42 
stimulus being applied to our own cheek in a congruent location, an effect known as Visual 43 
Remapping of Touch (VRT: Serino et al., 2008). The effect of observed touch on tactile 44 
perception has been shown to be extinguished when somatosensory activity is disrupted using 45 
TMS (Fiorio & Haggard, 2005), which suggests that this effect is reliant on vicarious 46 
activation of the ‘somatosensory mirror system’.  47 
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Although the observation of touch can enhance perception of tactile stimulation 48 
delivered to the body, it very rarely elicits a conscious experience of touch in the absence of 49 
actual tactile stimulation. However, a type of synaesthesia has been identified which provides 50 
an interesting exception to this case. For individuals with Mirror Touch Synaesthesia (MTS), 51 
observing others being touched consistently produces a marked conscious experience of 52 
touch on their own body. This experience is thought to occur in approximately 1.6% of 53 
people (Banissy, Cohen Kadosh, Maus, Walsh & Ward, 2009) and to be a consequence of 54 
increased cortical activity within the somatosensory mirror system (Blakemore et al., 2005). 55 
Consistent with the purported role of this system in social cognition, MTS individuals show 56 
enhanced emotion recognition (Banissy et al., 2011) and score more highly on empathy 57 
measures (Banissy & Ward, 2007) than non-synaesthetes. Although not yet explicitly tested, 58 
it has been suggested that the increased activity within the somatosensory mirror system in 59 
MTS is mediated by mechanisms involved in self-other discrimination. Moreover, several 60 
authors have suggested that MTS may be linked to a blurring of self-other boundaries when 61 
perceiving touch to another person (Banissy et al., 2009; Banissy, Walsh & Muggleton, 2011; 62 
Amiola-Davis & White, 2012), leading to a disinhibition of normal somatosensory mirror 63 
mechanisms (Fitzgibbon et al., 2012). 64 
Intriguingly, in non-synaesthetes, we can experimentally induce a blurring of self-65 
other boundaries by employing synchronous visuotactile stimulation (Tsakiris, 2010). This 66 
type of stimulation can evoke bodily illusions, induce misattributions of viewed tactile 67 
sensations to the self, and eventually change the perceptual boundaries between self and 68 
other. For example, in the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), tactile stimulation delivered in 69 
synchrony to the participant’s own unseen hand and a visible fake rubber hand can induce 70 
illusory ownership over the rubber hand, and induces the participant to attribute the tactile 71 
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sensations on their own hand to the touch they can see on the rubber hand (Botvinick & 72 
Cohen, 1998).  73 
In a facial analogue of the RHI, touch is delivered to a participant’s face whilst they 74 
view a video in which another person is being touched on a specularly-congruent location in 75 
synchrony with the participant’s felt touch (Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard & Aglioti, 2010; 76 
Tsakiris, 2008). This procedure, known as the ‘Enfacement Illusion’, elicits a situation akin 77 
to looking at oneself in a mirror, yet seeing an unfamiliar person’s face in place of your own 78 
reflection. During enfacement, participants report a change in the experience of the source of 79 
sensation from their own face to the other’s, and a subjective increase in perceived similarity 80 
between the other and themselves (Tajadura-Jimenez, Grehl & Tsakiris, 2012).  81 
This subjective increase in self-other similarity is accompanied by a measurable 82 
behavioural change in the way participants represent their own facial appearance (the ‘self-83 
face representation’). Tajadura-Jimenez et al. (2012) presented participants with morphed 84 
faces containing varying percentages of their own face, and they decided whether each face 85 
looked more like themselves, or an unfamiliar other. After experiencing the enfacement 86 
illusion with the other’s face, the images that participants had initially perceived as 87 
containing equal quantities of self and other became more likely to be recognised as the self. 88 
The direction of this change was elucidated by Tajadura-Jimenez et al. in an additional 89 
experiment, in which they demonstrated that the enfacement illusion independently affected 90 
recognition of the self-face, while recognition of the other’s face remained unchanged. 91 
Specifically, they showed that when participants watched a video of another’s face gradually 92 
morphing into their own face after a period of enfacement, they accepted faces with a higher 93 
percentage of ‘other’ as ‘self’. Importantly, however, this change did not occur when they 94 
watched a video showing the other direction of morphing, from self to other. This suggests 95 
that the synchronous shared touch of the enfacement illusion induced participants to 96 
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incorporate features of the other’s face into their own face representation, resulting in the 97 
participants representing the other’s face as more similar to their own.  98 
This supports a multisensory account of the self, whereby our stored representations 99 
of our physical appearance (our ‘body representations’) are not solely derived from stable 100 
representations, but instead is maintained and updated by integrated multisensory experiences 101 
(Tsakiris, 2008). We may recognize and form a mental representation of our own face 102 
because our mirror reflection moves when we move, and we see it being touched when we 103 
feel touch ourselves.  In both the RHI and enfacement illusion, an individual experiences a 104 
touch that they see on another  body, resulting in measurable changes in their body 105 
representations. This sharing of another’s tactile experience bears similarities to MTS. This 106 
raises the intriguing possibility that when MTS individuals view touch on others, it not only 107 
elicits a shared tactile experience, but actually alters their body representation, in the same 108 
way that bodily illusions such as enfacement and RHI induce change in non-synaesthetes.  109 
We aimed to investigate changes in body representation in MTS, by inducing the 110 
enfacement illusion in MTS individuals without delivering physical touch to their faces, and 111 
measuring the effect of pure tactile observation on their stored self-face representation. 112 
Aimola-Davies and White (2012) recently demonstrated that RHI can be induced in MTS 113 
participants without delivering physical touch to their own hand, by allowing them merely to 114 
observe touch on the rubber hand. The synaesthetic touch that they experienced induced a 115 
subjective incorporation of the rubber hand into their body representation. However, it 116 
remains to be answered whether synaesthetic touch can change stored mental representations 117 
of a key feature of one’s self-identity, such as one’s own face. 118 
This study consisted of two experiments. In the first experiment, a group of MTS 119 
participants and a group of non-synaesthetic controls viewed another’s face being touched, 120 
but were not physically touched themselves. For MTS individuals, we hypothesised that the 121 
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synaesthetic experience of seeing touch on another’s face could change their self-face 122 
representation, in the same way that physical experience of touch seen on another’s face 123 
changes the self-face representations of non-synaesthetic individuals. To test this, we 124 
measured self face-recognition before and after the enfacement session to investigate whether 125 
there were any changes in self-face representation induced by the observation of touch. We 126 
also measured the participants’ subjective experiences of ownership, self-other similarity, and 127 
self-attribution of touch. A control condition was employed, in which the face that the 128 
participants viewed was untouched. This controlled for effects of mere exposure to the 129 
other’s face, and thus ensured that any effect we did find was specific to experienced touch, 130 
rather than mere visual exposure to the face of another individual. In a second control 131 
experiment, we investigated the similarity of this effect to the standard Enfacement Illusion in 132 
participants without synaesthesia. Another non-MTS control group observed touch on 133 
another’s face whilst physical touch was delivered on their own face, following the standard 134 
procedure of the enfacement illusion.  Subsequent changes in self-face recognition were 135 
compared to those elicited by the mere observation of touch in MTS individuals.  136 
2. Material and Methods 137 
2.1. Participants 138 
Potential MTS participants were first selected through self-report via a web-based 139 
questionnaire investigating different types of synaesthesia. Those (n=25) who answered 140 
‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ to the statement ‘I sometimes feel touch when I see other people 141 
being touched’ on a 5-point Likert scale were subsequently contacted to complete a further 142 
web screening devised by Holle and colleagues (Holle, Banissy, Wright, Bowling & Ward, 143 
2011). Participants saw a series of videos of people and objects being either touched or 144 
approached by a finger. Participants were asked to report on their experiences of touch, if 145 
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any, for each video. Six participants (all female1, MAGE = 19.0 years) who gave reports of 146 
experienced touch in two or more of the videos in which people were touched, reflecting 147 
4.3% of the total questionnaire respondents, were selected to participate in Experiment 1.  148 
Twenty non-MTS participants (all female) were also recruited for the study. Non-149 
MTS status was confirmed by self-report on the web-based questionnaire, to which all 150 
participants answered “strongly disagree” to the statement ‘I sometimes feel touch when I see 151 
other people being touched’. Ten of these non-MTS participants (MAGE = 19.9 years), 152 
referred to as the Control-1 group, participated in Experiment 1and performed exactly the 153 
same task as the MTS individuals. The remaining ten non-MTS participants ( MAGE = 20.7 154 
years), referred to as the Control-2 group, participated in Experiment 2 which followed the 155 
standard enfacement procedure, allowing us to compare the effect of touch observation in 156 
MTS with the effect of standard enfacement in non-MTS participants.  157 
2.2. Procedure 158 
The procedure employed to generate the experimental stimuli was identical for both 159 
Experiments 1 and 2. Two female individuals were selected to model as the face of the 160 
‘other’. A photo and two videos were recorded with each model looking straight into the 161 
camera with a neutral expression. For the ‘TOUCH’ video, their right cheek was stroked with 162 
a cotton bud every three seconds, whereas for the ‘NO-TOUCH’ video, no tactile stimulation 163 
was delivered. Before the experiment began, we took a photo of each participant’s face, 164 
which we subsequently mirror-reversed to most closely match their stored facial 165 
representation. From this photo, morphed face stimuli were generated by morphing the 166 
participant’s face with the two models’ faces. This produced two sets of 100 images for each 167 
                                                            
1 The fact that all MTS participants were female may be partly due to the high proportion of females initially 
responding to the web‐based questionnaire (76%). Because of this gender bias in selection, we make no 
empirical claims about the gender ratio of mirror‐touch synaesthetes in the general population. Only females 
were chosen for subsequent control groups in order to match the MTS group for gender. 
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participant, which contained increasing amounts of the participant’s face ranging from 0% 168 
(100% model) to 100% (0% model). These images were used as stimuli in both experiments. 169 
2.2.1. Procedure for Experiment 1 170 
The MTS group and the Control-1 group participated in Experiment 1. The 171 
experiment comprised two experimental blocks; one for the TOUCH condition and one for 172 
the NO-TOUCH condition (see Figure 1). Each block began with a self-recognition task, in 173 
which each trial displayed a morphed image, and the participant had to decide whether the 174 
image looked more like the self, or the other. The first set of trials were presented in an 175 
interleaved double-staircase procedure, following that of Tajadura-Jimenez et al. (2012), in 176 
order to ascertain the participant’s ‘point of subjective equality’; the image at which they 177 
responded ‘self’ and ‘other’ at chance levels. This was taken as the baseline image. For the 178 
final 60 trials of the self-recognition task, the participant was presented with images 179 
containing subjectively more other than self (‘Other’ trials: 8% less self than baseline, and 180 
4% less self than baseline), the baseline image, and images containing subjectively more self 181 
than other (‘Self’ trials: 4% more self than baseline, and 8% more self than baseline). The 182 
choice of these images was based on the results of previous studies investigating the effect of 183 
enfacement on self-recognition. The enfacement effect has been shown to only occur when 184 
self-other discrimination is difficult, and thus only to images close to Baseline (the PSE). 185 
Previous studies have shown a change in self-recognition around the Baseline of between 3% 186 
and 6% (e.g. Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2008). Thus, we 187 
tested self-recognition at Baseline, as well as to images with up to 8% more Other (Other 188 
images), and up to 8% more Self (Self images) in order to ensure that we had a high change 189 
of detecting any likely changes to self recognition in the MTS group. There were 20 ‘Other’ 190 
trials, 20 baseline trials, and 20 ‘Self’ trials presented in total, and order of trials was 191 
randomised.  192 
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The participant was then shown a 2-minute video of the model (either the TOUCH or 193 
NO-TOUCH video), during which the participant was instructed to keep as still as possible 194 
whilst viewing the video, and to keep their eyes on the model’s face at all times. The 195 
participant then completed another self-recognition task, with the same range of -8%, -4%, 196 
baseline, +4% and +8% images as in the pre-video stage. Finally, the participant reported 197 
their subjective experiences by completing an Illusion Questionnaire, in which they were 198 
presented with a set of statements (9 for the TOUCH condition, 8 for the NO-TOUCH 199 
condition, adapted from Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012) on a computer screen in a random 200 
order, and rated their agreement with each one using a 7-point Likert scale.  201 
Each participant completed one TOUCH block and one NO-TOUCH block. The 202 
model featuring as the ‘other’ face was consistent within, but differed between, experimental 203 
blocks. A different model was used for each block to avoid the experience with a model in 204 
one condition ‘carrying over’ to affect subsequent self-recognition responses in the following 205 
condition. The order of conditions and the model assigned to each condition was 206 
counterbalanced between participants.  207 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 208 
2.2.2. Procedure for Experiment 2 209 
The Control-2 group participated in Experiment 2, which contained two experimental 210 
conditions. For the ENFACEMENT condition, they performed self-recognition before and 211 
after observing a TOUCH video, during which they received concurrent touch to their left 212 
cheek in synchrony with the touch they observed on the model’s cheek, as per the standard 213 
enfacement illusion procedure. For the NO-TOUCH condition, they performed self-214 
recognition before and after the NO-TOUCH video, in which they merely viewed the model 215 
in the absence of touch delivered to either the participant’s or the model’s face. The 216 
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procedure for this condition was identical to that of the NO-TOUCH condition in Experiment 217 
1. All other aspects of the task and procedure (e.g. videos, face-recognition task, Illusion 218 
Questionnaire) were identical to Experiment 1. 219 
3. Results 220 
First, we analysed the data from Experiment 1 to investigate the effects of touch 221 
observation on self-face recognition in MTS and non-MTS individuals. We then analysed the 222 
data from Experiment 2 and conducted statistical comparisons with key results from 223 
Experiment 1, to allow us to assess the similarities between the effect of touch observation in 224 
the MTS group to the effect of the Enfacement Illusion in the non-MTS (Control-2) group. 225 
3.1. Results of Experiment 1 226 
For each participant, the proportion of ‘self’ responses given to each type of image 227 
was calculated for both the pre- and post-video self-recognition tasks. The -8% and -4% 228 
images (containing a lower percentage of self than the baseline image) were categorized as 229 
the ‘Other’ images, and the +4% and +8% images (containing a higher percentage of self 230 
than baseline) were categorized as the ‘Self’ images.  231 
Given the small sample sizes, our data were most suited to non-parametric analysis. 232 
However, due to the limited applicability of non-parametric methods to mixed factorial 233 
designs, we first performed an initial ANOVA in order to identify any interactions between 234 
factors, before proceeding to investigate and verify these interactions using non-parametric 235 
analyses. To begin, the proportion of ‘self’ responses were entered into a 2(time: Pre vs. Post-236 
video) x 3(image: Other vs. Baseline vs. Self) x 2(condition: TOUCH vs. NO-TOUCH) x 237 
2(group: MTS vs. Control-1) repeated measures ANOVA. Residuals were subjected to 238 
Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality and none deviated significantly from a normal distribution, 239 
all p-values > .05. Although Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was not violated, W = 0.876, p = 240 
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.422, we proceeded to use Greenhouse-Geisser corrections to ensure the most conservative 241 
tests for our small samples. There was no significant main effect of group on proportion of 242 
self-responses, F(1,14) = 0.75, p = .400. There was however an expected main effect of 243 
image, F(1.23,14.00) = 53.96, p < .001, with Self images eliciting the highest proportion of 244 
self-responses, M = .72, followed by Baseline images, M = .54, followed by Other images, M 245 
= .33. Importantly, this main effect was modulated by a four-way interaction between time, 246 
image, condition and group, F(1.78,24.91) = 3.74, p = .042. No other main effects or 247 
interactions were significant. 248 
To investigate the four-way interaction, we first ensured that there were no significant 249 
differences between the two groups on pre-video self-recognition performance. Pre-video 250 
scores were entered into a mixed repeated-measures ANOVA with image (Other vs. Baseline 251 
vs. Self), condition (TOUCH vs. NO-TOUCH) and group (MTS vs. Control-1) as factors, 252 
which revealed an expected main effect of image, F(1.47,20.60) = 49.08, p < .001, but no 253 
main effect of group, F(1,14) = 0.68, p = .425, nor any interactions (p > .05). We then 254 
calculated change scores by subtracting pre- from post-video self-responses, and investigated 255 
the effect of condition and image type on self-recognition change for each group separately.  256 
In the Control-1 group, a 3(image: Other vs. Baseline vs. Self) x 2(condition: TOUCH 257 
vs. NO-TOUCH) ANOVA did not reveal any significant main effect of condition, F(1,9) = 258 
0.66, p = .803, nor a Condition x Image interaction, F(1.98,17.77) = 0.57, p = .571. In the 259 
MTS group, however, the ANOVA yielded an interaction between image and condition on 260 
change in self-responses, F(1.24,6.21) = 16.56, p = .010. Visual inspection of the means 261 
suggested that only self-recognition change to the baseline image had been affected by 262 
condition (see Figure 2). This was confirmed using non-parametric pairwise comparisons. 263 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests were used to compare self-recognition change scores between 264 
TOUCH and NO-TOUCH conditions for Self, Baseline and Other image types individually. 265 
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For the MTS group, change scores to Baseline images were significantly higher in the 266 
TOUCH condition, M = .267 (SD = .260) than the NO-TOUCH condition, M = .067 (SD = 267 
.178), z = -2.06, p = .039. A one-sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank test on change scores for 268 
NO-TOUCH showed no significant difference from zero, p = .496, suggesting that the NO-269 
TOUCH condition did not yield any significant changes in self-recognition. There were no 270 
significant differences between conditions for Self images, z = -0.11, p = .916, or for Other 271 
images, z = -1.47, p = .141. For the Control-1 group, there were no significant differences 272 
between conditions for any of the three image types, all p>.05, thus confirming the general 273 
pattern of interaction illustrated in the initial ANOVA.  274 
[insert Figure 2 about here] 275 
Responses to the Illusion Questionnaire were then analysed. Independent t-tests were 276 
employed to compare mean responses across all questions between groups, for each 277 
condition. For the TOUCH condition, the MTS group gave a significantly higher mean rating 278 
to the Illusion Questionnaire (across all questions) than did the Control-1 group, t(13.93) = -279 
3.57, p = .003. For the NO-TOUCH condition, the ratings given by the two groups did not 280 
significantly differ, t(14) = -1.01, p = .332. Group differences in median responses for each 281 
individual question were analysed using Mann-Whitney U tests, the results of which can be 282 
found in Table 1.  283 
[insert Table 1 about here] 284 
3.2. Results of Experiment 2 285 
The results from the Control-2 group in Experiment 2 allowed us to investigate the 286 
similarity of the reported effect in MTS to the standard Enfacement Illusion in non-MTS 287 
participants. First, we confirmed and replicated the standard enfacement effect on self-288 
recognition (see Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2008). Change 289 
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scores for Control-2 were calculated by subtracting pre- from post-video self-responses, as in 290 
the previous analysis of MTS results. The change scores to Baseline images were compared 291 
within-subjects between ENFACEMENT and NO-TOUCH conditions with a Wilcoxon 292 
Signed Rank test. As predicted, there was a significant difference in the proportion of self-293 
responses in the ENFACEMENT condition and the NO-TOUCH condition, z = -1.94, p = 294 
.052, with the ENFACEMENT condition yielding a significantly larger increase in self-295 
recognition than the NO-TOUCH condition, MENFACEMENT = .235 (SD = .277), MNO-TOUCH = 296 
.050 (SD = .247).  297 
We were then interested in comparing our Enfacement effect with the effect of 298 
viewing touch, both for individuals with MTS and for non-synaesthetes. For our three groups 299 
of participants (MTS, Control-1, Control-2), we calculated difference scores by subtracting 300 
change scores in the experimental condition (for MTS and Control-1, this was the TOUCH 301 
condition, and for Control-2, this was the ENFACEMENT condition) from change scores in 302 
the NO-TOUCH condition (which did not significantly differ between groups, Kruskal-303 
Wallis test p = .208). These difference scores reflected the differential effect of our 304 
experimental manipulation (viewing touch for MTS and Control-1, or Enfacement for 305 
Control-2) relative to that of merely viewing an untouched face. The calculation of these 306 
scores allowed us to compare the differential effects of our experimental conditions on self-307 
recognition between groups, using non-parametric methods, without losing vital information 308 
regarding the relative changes between experimental and control conditions. 309 
We first compared difference scores between TOUCH in non-MTS participants 310 
(Control-1) and ENFACEMENT in non-MTS participants (Control-2). This revealed a 311 
significant difference, U = 19.5, p = .021, whereby for non-MTS participants, 312 
ENFACEMENT yielded a significantly larger difference score, Mdn = 0.25, than did 313 
TOUCH, Mdn, -.05. This suggests that, as expected, ENFACEMENT had a significantly 314 
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larger effect than TOUCH for non-MTS participants on self-recognition change, relative to 315 
the NO-TOUCH control condition. We then compared the differential effects of TOUCH for 316 
MTS participants to the differential effects of ENFACEMENT for Control-2 participants, 317 
using a Mann-Whitney U test on difference scores. This revealed no significant difference, U 318 
= 28.0, p = .827, which suggests that the behavioural effect of TOUCH on self-recognition 319 
change for the MTS group was equivalent to that of ENFACEMENT for non-MTS 320 
individuals, relative to the NO-TOUCH control condition.  321 
Finally, the non-MTS group’s responses to the Illusion Questionnaire after the 322 
ENFACEMENT condition were compared to the MTS group’s responses after the TOUCH 323 
condition, to investigate whether their subjective experiences during the videos were also 324 
equivalent. A Mann-Whitney U test revealed no significant difference in average strength of 325 
illusory experience (comprising the mean response to all nine illusion questions) between the 326 
groups, U = 25.0, z = -0.543, p = .587, suggesting that the TOUCH condition for MTS 327 
individuals elicited an illusory experience of a similar strength to that elicited by the 328 
ENFACEMENT condition in non-synaesthetes. We then compared scores given on 329 
individual items between groups; there were no significant group differences on any 330 
questionnaire item, p > .05. 331 
4. Discussion 332 
We investigated the malleability of self-other boundaries with a self-face recognition 333 
task in a group of individuals with Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia (MTS). While somatosensory 334 
processing in MTS has been extensively investigated, the extent to which synaesthetic touch 335 
can also lead to changes in self-other boundaries remains unknown. To investigate this, MTS 336 
and control individuals took part in an adapted version of the ‘enfacement illusion’ paradigm, 337 
in which they observed the face of an unfamiliar person being touched or not, without being 338 
touched themselves. To quantify the changes in self-other boundaries as a result of 339 
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synaesthetic experience, we administered a self-face recognition task before and after the 340 
exposure to the other face. While self-recognition performance for both groups was similar 341 
during pre-test, the MTS participants showed a specific and significant change in self-342 
recognition performance following the observation of touch delivered to the other face. 343 
During the standard enfacement illusion paradigm, tactile stimulation is delivered to 344 
participants’ faces whilst they observe another person’s face being touched in synchrony. 345 
This experience of synchronous ‘shared touch’ elicits a measurable change in participants’ 346 
stored mental representation of their own face, to incorporate elements of the other’s face 347 
(Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012). The results of the present study suggest that, in a way that is 348 
analogous to the classic enfacement illusion,  for MTS the observation of touch on others not 349 
only elicits a conscious experience of touch, but also a change in the mental representation of 350 
the self-face, analogous to the change induced in non-synaesthetes when exposed to the 351 
enfacement illusion.  352 
In the MTS group, but not the non-MTS group, self-face recognition was significantly 353 
altered after viewing touch on another’s face. Specifically, the images that MTS participants 354 
had initially perceived as containing equal quantities of self and other became more likely to 355 
be recognised as the self after viewing the other being touched. A ‘no-touch’ control 356 
condition did not yield any changes in self-recognition, demonstrating that the effect was 357 
specific to the experience of touch rather than any general effect of visual familiarity. Our 358 
results suggested that the MTS participants’ mental representations of their facial appearance 359 
had been updated to incorporate features of the other’s face, enhancing perceived self-other 360 
similarity. This behavioural effect was accompanied by subjective reports of increased self-361 
other resemblance, ownership and illusory touch whilst watching the other being touched.   362 
In a second experiment, we compared the effect of touch observation in MTS 363 
individuals to the effect of the standard Enfacement Illusion in non-synaesthetes. We 364 
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demonstrated that the effect of viewing touch on self-recognition in MTS was equivalent to 365 
the change in self-recognition elicited by enfacement in a group of non-MTS participants. 366 
Furthermore, analysis of questionnaire responses showed that the observation of touch 367 
elicited a phenomenology in MTS participants that was of equivalent intensity and subjective 368 
quality to the phenomenological experience elicited by the Enfacement Illusion in non-369 
synaesthetes. 370 
Imaging studies have identified a network of brain areas involved in representing and 371 
distinguishing self from other, comprising the inferior parietal lobule and inferior frontal 372 
gyrus, the temporoparietal junction, and the right insula (see Northoff, Qin & Feinberg, 2011, 373 
for review). Banissy et al. (2009) highlight this network as likely to be atypical in MTS, 374 
leading to a remapping of observed sensations onto the self. In particular, the right insular 375 
lobe has been shown to be involved in key domains of self-processing, such as body-376 
ownership (Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard & Fink, 2007), empathy (Singer et al., 2004) and 377 
self-face recognition (Devue et al., 2007; Morita et al., 2008). Intriguingly, Blakemore et al. 378 
(2005) found that the anterior insula was the only area to be activated solely in an individual 379 
with MTS, and not in control participants, during the observation of touch. The anterior 380 
insula is anatomically connected to the secondary somatosensory cortex (Mesulam & 381 
Mufson, 1985), which might act as a neural pathway whereby self-related processing and 382 
tactile awareness interact. Further work is needed to elucidate the causal connections between 383 
these areas, both in MTS and non-MTS individuals. 384 
The self-face recognition task employed in the current study does not give 385 
information about the directionality of the change in face recognition. However, we believe it 386 
likely that our effect observed in the MTS group reflects a specific change in the 387 
representation of the self-face, rather than the other-face, for two reasons. First, the results of 388 
a video-morphing task used by Tajadura-Jimenez et al. (2012) found that enfacement in non-389 
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synaesthetic participants elicited a significant change in self-face recognition, whilst leaving 390 
other-face recognition unchanged. Given that our study has revealed notable behavioural and 391 
phenomenological similarities between the enfacement illusion in non-MTS individuals, and 392 
the observation of touch in MTS individuals, it is likely that the direction of the effect in the 393 
MTS group is the same as that reported by Tajadura-Jimenez et al. Second, this prediction is 394 
also consistent with the overall phenomenology of MTS, as a type of synaesthesia 395 
characterised by an interjection of the other into the self, rather than a projection of the self 396 
into others. For example, MTS individuals incorporate the touch of others onto their own 397 
bodies, but do not project their own touch experience onto other’s bodies. To be consistent 398 
with this general phenomenology of MTS, we would expect the features of others to be 399 
incorporated into the self-face representation, rather than the features of one’s own face being 400 
projected onto the other’s face. Concordantly, the MTS group in the current study gave 401 
significantly higher agreement ratings to the statement "It seemed like my own face began to 402 
resemble the other person's face" during the TOUCH video than they did to the statement "It 403 
seemed like the other's face began to resemble my own face", relative to the non-MTS control 404 
group, which again suggests that the effect seen in this group reflects a specific, directional 405 
change in the representation of the self-face, rather than the other-face. 406 
It is possible that the effect of viewing touch on self-face representation in MTS 407 
individuals may not be due to the experience of illusory touch on their own face, but a more 408 
general effect of increased attention or tactile imagery. However, previous work has shown 409 
that attentional factors are unlikely to explain MTS, as individuals with MTS experience 410 
touch when they see touch on faces, but not when they see touch on objects (Holle et al., 411 
2011) nor when a light flash merely cues attention to a specific area of an observed face 412 
(Banissy et al., 2009). In addition, it has been shown that imagery alone is not enough to 413 
induce MTS in such individuals, as they experience touch only when they see touch on 414 
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another face, but not when they see a hand merely approaching the face (Holle et al., 2011). 415 
Our MTS participants were recruited following a screening protocol which involved videos 416 
of hands delivering touch to, or merely approaching, a variety of stimuli (objects, dummy 417 
body-parts, and humans). Our MTS participants reported synesthetic touch solely during 418 
observation of touch to humans, and not during observation of touch to objects or dummies. 419 
Furthermore, in line with previously verified individuals with MTS, they did not experience 420 
synesthetic touch when viewing hands merely approaching faces. Therefore, it is unlikely that 421 
changes in self-face representation in the MTS group were due merely to higher tactile 422 
imagery abilities, or increased attention to tactile events. 423 
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that the observation of touch can induce a 424 
measurable change in the stored self-face representations of MTS individuals. After viewing 425 
another’s face being touched, MTS participants incorporated features of the other’s face into 426 
their own face representation. This lends further support to the multisensory account of the 427 
self, which argues that our representations of our own body, including the representation of 428 
our face, are continually updated by integrated multisensory experiences. Importantly, this 429 
study has shown that, for MTS individuals, the presence of physical touch is not necessary to 430 
update body representations. In this case, the integrated experience of observed touch and 431 
synaesthetic touch is sufficient to cause a significant change in self-face representation and 432 
self-other boundaries. This effect was shown to be quantitatively and qualitatively similar to 433 
the change in self-recognition seen after the Enfacement Illusion in non-synaesthetes. Whilst 434 
other studies have investigated the remapping of observed touch to the self in MTS, ours is 435 
the first to demonstrate that this remapping of touch significantly changes the way 436 
synaesthetes represent their own bodies. Given the documented engagement of the insula and 437 
secondary somatosensory cortex in MTS (Blakemore et al., 2005) as well as in body-438 
awareness in non-MTS individuals (Tsakiris et al., 2007), the behavioural results of the 439 
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present study advance our understanding of the multisensory basis of the self and its 440 
involvement in key social cognition processes such as the self-other distinction. 441 
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Figure Captions 531 
Figure 1. The design of Experiment 1. Each participant completed two experimental blocks, 532 
comprising TOUCH and NO-TOUCH conditions. A self-recognition task, performed both 533 
before and after viewing a video, required participants to decide whether morphed images 534 
looked more like their own face, or that of another.  535 
Figure 2. Left Panel: Change in proportion of ‘self’ responses given by MTS and non-MTS 536 
groups after viewing TOUCH and NO-TOUCH videos, for Self, Baseline, and Other images. 537 
Starred contrast indicates significance at two-tailed level. Positive change in ‘self’ responses 538 
signifies an increase in the proportion of ‘self’ responses after viewing the video. Right 539 
Panel: Change in proportion of ‘self’ responses given by non-MTS group after experiencing 540 
ENFACEMENT, in which synchronous tactile stimulation is delivered to the face during 541 
observation of TOUCH video (Experiment 2). Again, starred contrast indicates significance 542 
at two-tailed level. Error bars indicate S.E.M.543 
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Table 1. Table showing median Likert responses given by MTS and non-MTS (Control-1) groups to each Illusion question ranging from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree), for TOUCH and 
NO-TOUCH conditions. P-values for individual questions indicate the results of Mann-Whitney U tests comparing the responses to each questionnaire item between MTS and non-MTS groups. P-
values for ‘Total Mean Response’ indicate the results of independent t-tests comparing the mean response across all items of the questionnaire between groups. Asterisks indicate significance at α=.05. 
Illusion Question TOUCH M(SD) NO-TOUCH M(SD) 
 MTS NON-MTS p-value  MTS NON-MTS p-value  
"I felt like the other's face was my face" 1.00 (1.37) -2.50 (1.37) .008* 0.50 (1.47) -2.00 (1.95) .122 
"It seemed like the other's face belonged to me" 0.00 (2.17) -2.00 (0.67) .126 -1.50 (1.83) -2.00 (1.94) .781 
"It seemed like I was looking at my own mirror reflection" 0.50 (1.54) -2.00 (1.94) .263 -0.50 (2.07) -2.00 (1.51) .342 
"It seemed like the other's face began to resemble my own face" 0.50 (2.06) -1.50 (1.51) .098 0.00 (1.47) 0.00 (2.12) .657 
"It seemed like my own face began to resemble the other person's face" 1.00 (1.03) -2.50 (1.64) .005* 0.50 (1.94) -1.00 (2.01) .473 
"It seemed like my own face was out of my control" -0.50 (1.63) -2.00 (1.84) .200 0.00 (1.63) -2.00 (1.34) .095 
"It seemed like the experience of my face was less vivid than normal" 1.50 (1.26) 0.00 (2.32) .203 0.50 (1.47) 0.00 (1.96) .378 
"I felt that I was imitating the other person" 1.00 (1.03) -0.50 (1.94) .305 1.00 (1.52) 1.00 (1.99) .197 
"I felt a touch on my face when I saw the cotton bud touching the other's face" 1.00 (1.83) -2.50 (1.33) .032* - - - 
Total Mean Response 0.30 (0.70) -1.49 (1.30) .003* 0.10 (1.07) -0.86 (1.50) .332 
